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
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Attorneys for Petitioner GIL NATHAN MILEIKOWSKY, M.D.



SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

FILED BY FAX

GIL NATHAN MILEIKOWSKY, M.D.,

Petitioner,

V\$.

MEDICAL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA

Respondent

CASE NO: 04CS00969

PETITIONER'S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES, COSTS AND EXPENSES UNDER THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL STATUTE (Code of Civil Procedure Section 1021.5); POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF GIL N. MILEIKOWSKY, M.D.

DATE: July 22, 2005 TIME: 11:00 A. M.

DEPT: 2

[Filed concurrently with the Declarations of Russell Iungerich; Roger Jon Diamond; Paul M. Hittelman; Lawrence R. Huntoon, M.D., PhD, FAAN; Dr. Robert Weinmann; Barbara Hensleigh; C. William Hinnant, Jr. M.D., J.D., and Dr. Deane Hillsman]

To the Honorable Raymond M. Cadei, Judge of the Superior Court and to Respondent and its attorneys of record:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on July 22, 2005 at 11:00 a.m. or as soon thereafter as the matter can be heard, in Department 25 of the above-entitled court, located at 720 9th Street, Sacramento, CA 95814-1398, Petitioner Gil N. Mileikowsky, M.D. will move the

2	Roger Jon Diamond, Esq., SBN 40146 2115 Main Street Santa Monica, CA 90405 Telephone(310) 399-3259; Fax (310) 392-902	29	
3 4 5	Paul M. Hittelman, Esq., SBN 33449 12400 Wilshire Boulevard, 15th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90025-1023 Telephone(310) 442-0555; Fax (310) 442-0888		
6 7	Attorneys for Petitioner GIL NATHAN MILEIKOWSKY, M.D.		
8	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA		
9	COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO		
10 11		ı	
12	GIL NATHAN MILEIKOWSKY, M.D.,	CASE NO: 04CS00969	
	Petitioner,	PETITIONER'S NOTICE OF MOTION	
13	VS.	AND MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES, COSTS AND EXPENSES UNDER	
14	MEDICAL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA	THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL STATUTE (Code of Civil Procedure	
15 16	Respondent	Section 1021.5); POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF GIL N. MILEIKOWSKY, M.D.	
17		DATE: July 22, 2005	
18		TIME: 11:00 A. M. DEPT: 25	
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20		of Russell Iungerich; Roger Jon Diamond; Paul M. Hittelman; Lawrence R. Huntoon.	
21		M.D., PhD, FAAN; Dr. Robert Weinmann; Barbara Hensleigh; C. William Hinnant, Jr. M.D, J.D., and Dr. Deane Hillsman]	
23			
ادع	To the Honorable Raymond M. Cadei,	Judge of the Superior Court and to Respondent	

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 court for an order awarding \$152,377.40 for attorneys' fees, costs and litigation expenses pursuant to the Private Attorney General Statute, Code of Civil Procedure Section 1021.5, on the following grounds:

- 1. The administrative decision that was the subject of this proceeding,
 Respondent's November 12, 2002 Order Compelling Mental and Physical Examination of
 Petitioner, was void, unenforceable, arbitrary, unreasonable, abusive of discretion and
 violated Petitioner's rights to good cause determination;
- 2. Petitioner prevailed on the merits in this proceeding affecting the public trust. The Judgment and Writ of Mandate issued at Petitioner's request provided a significant non-pecuniary benefit to the general public and a large class of persons: California physicians;
- 3. The Judgment and Writ of Mandate issued by this court serve the public interest and will greatly benefit the general public, by requiring the Medical Board of California in this case, and in cases involving proceedings where it is claimed that a medical licentiate is physically or mentally impaired, to assure that the public interest is protected by subjecting to Medical Board orders and discipline under Business and Professions Code §820 and §821, only those physicians who are determined, for good cause, based upon all relevant evidence, with participation of qualified, unbiased, disinterested medical experts, to be so impaired. This will assure full and free access to competent medical care provided by patient-chosen practitioners;
- 4. The Judgment and Writ of Mandate will serve as a deterrent to the Medical Board of California, and to medical boards of other states, and will constrain them from instituting and prosecuting mental and physical examination proceedings against practitioners as to whom there is no good cause determination, by an impartial, fairly selected qualified expert, free of conflicts of interest, and based upon all available evidence, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that such impairment exists.
- 5. The necessity and financial burden of private enforcement and vindication of Petitioner's rights make an award to Petitioner of attorneys fees, costs of expenses under Section 1021.5 appropriate;

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This motion is based upon this paper, the attached Points and Authorities and Declaration of Gil N. Mileikowsky, M.D., the concurrently filed declarations of Lawrence R. Huntoon, M.D., Ph.D., F.A.A.N., Dr. Deane Hillsman, C. William Hinnant, M.D., J.D., Dr. Robert Weinmann, Barbara Hensleigh, Russell Iungerich, Roger Jon Diamond, and Paul M. Hittelman, and upon the pleadings, papers and records on file in this action.

Dated:

June 20, 2005

ROGER JON DIAMOND ESQ.

PAUL M. HITTELMAN, ESQ.

PAUL M. HITTELMAN

Attorneys for Petitioner, Gil Nathan Mileikowsky, M.D.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

Having succeeded in this proceeding in procuring Judgment entered December 21, 2004, and issuance of the Writ of Mandate issued December 30, 2004, Petitioner seeks by this motion, to recover the \$152,377.40 in attorneys' fees costs and expenses he incurred in prosecuting the matter where this award is sought under the provisions of the Private Attorney General Statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 (hereafter "§1021.5").

The declarations of Petitioner, four prominent physicians affiliated with professional organizations (Lawrence R. Huntoon, M.D., PhD, FAAN; Dr. Robert Weinmann; C. William Hinnant, Jr. M.D, J.D., and Dr. Deane Hillsman, and a prominent physicians' attorney, Barbara Hensleigh, amply demonstrate that all of the criteria that must be established to warrant an award under such a §1021.5 are present in this case, as:

- Petitioner prevailed on the merits in this proceeding, which enforced rights affecting the public interest by procuring a Judgment and Writ of Mandate, requiring the Medical Board of California, when ordering physicians to undergo physical and psychological examinations, to do so only upon appropriate showings of good cause based upon evaluation of all available evidence with the participation of qualified, unbiased, disinterested medical reviewers.
- The Judgment and Writ of Mandate in this proceeding provided a significant non-pecuniary benefit to both the general public and a large class of persons: California physicians, both as to procedural and privacy rights. as:

The general public will benefit by having continued access to, and the free choice of, qualified physicians whose number will not be arbitrarily reduced by physicians disciplined based upon determinations by medical reviewers who are biased or subject to conflicts of interest, and upon determinations made in the absence of good cause based on consideration and evaluation of all available relevant evidence.

As Petitioner proceeded against the governmental agency, the necessity of

private enforcement is established;

The financial burden upon Petitioner of private enforcement makes the award of attorneys' fees necessary and appropriate; the proceeding and its costs transcended Petitioner's personal interest and placed a disproportionate burden upon him, although, in the long run, the successful results of this proceeding may not ultimately benefit Petitioner, the public, and other physicians will undoubtedly benefit.

The circumstances of this case and the applicable law amply warrant the award of the attorneys' fees, costs and expenses incurred in procuring the Judgment and Writ of Mandate and the attorneys' fees and costs incurred and that will be incurred in this motion.

II. ARGUMENT

A. AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL STATUTE, CCP§ 1021.5 IS WARRANTED. ALL OF THE ELEMENTS NECESSARY TO THE APPLICATION OF THAT STATUTE ARE PRESENT

Code of Civil Procedure §1021.5 codifies the private attorney general statute providing for an award of attorney's fees for successful litigants in:..."any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or non-pecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement is such as to make the award appropriate and when (c) such fees should not in the interests of justice be paid out of a recovery, if any."

The basic principles applicable in all cases in which attorneys' fees are sought under the provisions of §1021.5 were recently well summarized in Ryan v. California Inter-Scholastic Federation (2001) 94 Cal.App4.1033 at 1044:

Section 1021.5 codifies the "private attorney general doctrine" adopted by our Supreme Court in Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25 [141 Cal.Rptr. 315, 569 P.2d 1303]. (Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311, 317 [193 Cal.Rptr. 900, 667 P.2d 704]; Flannery v. California Highway Patrol (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 629, 634 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 632]; Family Planning Specialists Medical Group, Inc. v. Powers (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1561, 1566 [46 Cal.Rptr.2d 667].) The doctrine is designed to encourage private enforcement of important public rights and to ensure aggrieved

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citizens access to the judicial process where statutory or constitutional rights have been violated. (Olney v. Municipal Court (1982) 133 Cal. App.3d 455, 463 [184 Cal. Rptr. 78].) In determining whether to award attorney fees under section 1021.5 to the "successful party," we apply a three-prong test inquiring whether (1) the litigation resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest, (2) a significant benefit has been conferred on the general public or a large class of individuals, and (3) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement renders the award appropriate. (Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 142 [185 Cal.Rptr. 232, 649 P.2d 874]; Family Planning Specialists Medical Group, Inc. v. Powers, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 1567; Planned Parenthood v. Aakhus (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 162, 169-170 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 510].) Regarding the nature of the public right, it must be important and cannot involve trivial or peripheral public policies. The significance of the benefit conferred is determined from a realistic assessment of all the relevant surrounding circumstances. As to the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement, an award is appropriate where the cost of the legal victory transcends the claimant's personal interest; in other words, where the burden of pursuing the litigation is out of proportion to the plaintiff's individual stake in the matter. (Olney v. Municipal Court, supra, 133 Cal. App. 3d at pp. 463-464.) The decision whether the claimant has met his burden of proving each of these prerequisites and is thus entitled to an award of attorney fees under section 1021.5 rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and that discretion shall not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse. (Family Planning Specialists Medical Group, Inc. v. Powers, supra, 39 Cal. App. 4th at p. 1567; Olney v. Municipal Court, supra, 133 Cal. App. 3d at p. 464.)

Each of the essential elements is satisfied here as the following discussion more particularly demonstrates.

1. <u>Petitioner prevailed on the merits in this action, which enforced rights affecting</u>
the public interest.

Petitioner successfully prosecuted this proceeding which resulted in a Judgment in his favor and the issuance of a Writ of Mandate ordering vacation of the Medical Board's order compelling physical and mental examination and its subsequent revocation of Petitioner's license.

That this proceeding enforced an important right affecting the public interest is clear. It is well established that "...the Legislature has recently specified that in exercising its discipline or authority, 'Protection of the public shall be the highest priority' of the Board. ([Business and Professions Code] §2229, subd.(a))" <u>Arnett v.Dal Cielo (1996) 14 Cal.4th</u>

4,9. Earlier decisional authority is to the same effect. In Ettinger v. BMQA (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 853, 856, the Court declared: "The purpose of an administrative proceeding concerning the revocation or suspension of a license is not to punish the individual; the purpose is to protect the public from dishonest, immoral, disreputable or incompetent practitioners." See also Yakov v. Board of Medical Examiners (1968) 68 Cal.2d 67, 73, N.6 ("The purpose of an action seeking revocation of a doctor's certificate is not to punish the doctor but rather to protect the public.")

Hence, since disciplinary proceedings so strongly affect the public interest, this proceeding enforcing the practitioner's rights in such proceedings is inextricably intertwined with the public interest.

2. A Significant Benefit Has Been Conferred On Both The General Public And California Physicians.

Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5 requires that an important right, although not necessarily a constitutional right be involved. That the right to free choice of medical practitioners is an important right within the purview of § 1021.5, is thoroughly well-established. Portions of the Business and Professions Code concerning physicians, including §§ 809, et seq, are devoted to the subject of peer review and, for protection of the public to assure free choice of qualified physicians, and to assure due process and fair hearing rights to physicians whose rights to practice are protected from arbitrary, unwarranted and unfounded disciplinary challenges re other provisions of the Business and Professions Code §§820 et seq., empower the Medical Board, under specified circumstances, when it appears that a licensee "...may not be able to practice his or her profession safely because the licentiate's ability to practice is impaired due to mental illness, or physical illness affecting competency...", to order the licensee to be examined by one or more physicians or

psychologists. This "investigatory" power however, may not be invoked without a showing of good cause. This limitation protecting physicians, and the public, from the unwarranted exercise of a draconian police power.

The authorities herein discussed amply demonstrate that Petitioner is entitled to an award of his attorneys' fees, costs and expenses incurred in instituting and maintaining this proceeding and in presenting this motion to recover these fees, costs and expenses, assuring procedural rights and privacy protection to physicians whose ability to practice must not be hindered by unfair, capricious, unwarranted or inappropriate disciplinary procedures.

Petitioner's supporting declarations, of physicians' organization officials and representatives establish that both the general public and physicians are benefitted by the Judgment and Writ of Mandate issued in this matter. The public's free choice of qualified physicians is promoted. Physicians may not be inappropriately disciplined or adversely affected in the rights to practice their profession by arbitrary and unreasonable attempts by the Medical Board to expose them to challenge their rights to practice through directing them to undergo physical and mental examinations required as a result of arbitrary determinations by unqualified, biased and conflict of interest affected "medical consultants," chosen in a manner that does not eliminate the possibility of bias or conflicts of interest..

The Judgment and Writ of Mandate restrain Respondent from arbitrarily and capriciously acting upon inherently unreliable bases for subjecting physicians to the humiliations and hostile physical and psychological testing.

3. As This Is A Proceeding Against A Government Agency And Its Officials, The Necessity Of Private Enforcement Is Established.

When a party to the proceeding in which §1021.5 attorneys' fees are sought is a government agency, the burden of private enforcement is obvious and deemed established.

(Sacramento v. Drew (1989) 207 Cal.App 3d 1287, 1299; See Also Woodland Hills Residents v. City Council (1979) 23Cal.App3d 917.

4. The Financial Burden Upon Petitioner Of Private Enforcement Makes The Award Of Attorneys' Fees Under §1021.5 Necessary And Appropriate.

Determination of whether the financial burden of private enforcement makes an award of attorney's fees under the statute appropriate depends on whether the cost of litigation in the mandate proceeding transcends the claimant's personal interest, that is, whether the litigation expenses would place a disproportionate burden upon him. This issue is addressed to the discretion of the court (Woodland Hills Residents' Association v. City Council, supra, 23 Cal 3rd 917, 942)

This litigation involved the immense burden of attorneys fees of more than \$150,000, through which Petitioner not only secured enforcement of his basic rights, he also established for other licensees the right to have physical and mental examination orders based, only upon the opinions of qualified unbiased, qualified experts, unaffected by real or potential conflicts of interest.

Petitioner's position is directly analogous to the petitioners in Otto v. Los Angeles Unified School District (2003) 106 Cal.App 4th 328 and Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal3d 128, 143 where there was no guarantee that securing the order for remand would assure that the petitioners would not thereafter be exposed to discipline or adverse circumstances. There is here, quite simply no assurance that if the Medical Board chooses to pursue what it began, through employing proper procedure consistent with Judgment and Writ of Mandate, with a qualified disinterested expert consultant, an order like that vacated by this Court's Writ of Mandate might not issue. The analogous situation in Otto and Baggett was discussed at length in Otto, supra, 106 Cal.App 4th at 333:

The trial court's and the District's positions are not in line with the Supreme Court's decision in <u>Baggett v. Gates, supra, 32 Cal.3d 128, 143 (Baggett)</u>. In Baggett, four police officers employed by the Los Angeles Police Department sued for a writ of mandate and declaratory and injunctive relief when they were

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reassigned to lower paying positions without being afforded an administrative appeal. The Supreme Court found they were entitled to an administrative appeal under the Act. The court also determined the plaintiffs were entitled to section 1021.5 attorney's fees. In addressing the question whether the cost of the officers' legal victory transcended their personal interest, the court found it did, stating: "By their action, plaintiffs have secured the enforcement of basic procedural rights, including the right to an administrative appeal of disciplinary actions. However, enforcement of these procedural rights may well not result in any pecuniary benefit to plaintiffs themselves. [Citation.] For example, plaintiffs' newly won right to an administrative appeal of the Department's decision to reassign them to lower paying positions will not necessarily result in the reversal of that decision. Plaintiffs' reassignment and consequent reduction in salary may be approved." (Baggett, at p. 143.) In other words, it was possible that even though the plaintiffs incurred attorney's fees, in the end they might never secure any financial benefit for themselves since there was no guarantee that their reassignment to lower paying positions would be overturned. The same is true in the instant case, only more so. Attorney's fees were incurred for trial court and appellate court proceedings, with no guarantee that securing an administrative appeal of the summary of conference would lead to its removal from Otto's file. The fees were incurred for the purpose of securing the administrative appeal so that Otto could have an opportunity to contest it. Moreover, whereas success at the administrative appeal level in *Baggett* would mean a reversal of the reassignment of those plaintiffs to lower paying jobs, which would constitute an immediate economic benefit to them, Otto's success at the appellate level would have no such immediate economic benefit because there might never have been any negative economic impact on him from having the summary of conference remain in his personnel file.

For the same reasons, here, it is clear that the cost of Petitioner's legal victory in this Court transcends his personal interest. Petitioner has secured the enforcement of basic procedural and due process rights, including the right to pre-petition evaluation by a qualified, disinterested expert, free of conflicts of interest. Nonetheless, enforcement of his procedural rights might well not result in any pecuniary benefit to Petitioner as, ultimately, the possibility exists that, if the required procedure is followed, Petitioner may be ordered to submit to mental and physical examinations which might, in turn, lead to a determination of impairment and consequent impact on his license status. Thus the financial burden of this proceeding greatly exceeded Petitioner's personal interest.

B. AN AWARD OF THE FULL AMOUNT OF PETITIONER'S ATTORNEYS' FEES AND EXPENSES, IN BOTH THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND COURT PROCEEDINGS SHOULD BE MADE

Section 1021.5 authorizes the court to award, when the criteria are established, as they are here, attorneys' fees "...in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an - 10 -

important right affecting the public interest...". Clearly, this authorizes the court to award attorneys' fees incurred in this mandate proceeding.

Similarly, however, where administrative proceedings and resulting litigation are sufficiently intertwined, as they certainly are here, §1021.5 fees may be awarded for services during the administrative proceeding. Hospital Systems, Inc. v. Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (1994) 25 Cal.App 4th 1686, 1692; Wallace v. Consumers Cooperative Of Berkeley (1985) 170 Cal.App 3d 836, 848-849.

Petitioner's Declaration, and the supporting declarations of his attorneys, Russell Iungerich, Roger Jon Diamond and Paul M. Hittelman establish that he has incurred, in connection with the underlying administrative proceeding and these proceedings, the following sums:

1)	Iungerich	and Spackma	<u>n:</u>

a)	Attorneys' Fees	\$77,815.00
b)	Costs and Disbursements	\$4,198.21
	Total	\$82,013.21

2) Roger Jon Diamond:

a)	Attorneys' Fees	\$40,680.00
b)	Costs and Disbursements	<u>\$7.00</u>
		040 (05 00

c) Total: \$40,687.00

3) Paul M. Hittelman:

a)	Attorneys' Fees	\$7,539.25
b)	Costs and Expenses	<u>\$11.00</u>
	Total:	\$7550.25

4) Costs and Expenses paid directly by Petitioner:

a)	Psychiatric examination and		
	testing	\$3,000.00	

b) Physical and neurological

,		over in etion	£250.00
1		examination	\$250.00
2	c)	Clinical laboratory tests	\$122.00
3	d)	Transcripts	\$621.65
4	e)	Courier Service (Filing)	\$164.85
5	f) Miscellaneous costs and		
6	expenses (postage, shipping,		
7		etc.)	\$271.21
8	g)	Duplicating and photocopying	\$1,659.33
9	h)	Travel expenses	<u>\$701.60</u>
10		Total	\$6,790.64
11			
12	SUMMARY OF COSTS INCURRED:		
13	Iungerich and Spackman Total \$82,013.21		\$82,013.21
14	Roger Jon Diamond Total \$40,687.00		
15	Paul M. Hittelman Total \$7,550.25		\$7,550.25
16	Expenses paid directly by Petitioner \$6,790.64		<u>\$6,790.64</u>
17	7 Total \$137,041.10		\$137,041.10
18	All of these sums are properly awardable under §1021.5 and should, under the		
19	circumstances be awarde	ed.	
20	Finally, the declaration of Paul M. Hittelman establishes that \$15,300 of additional		
21	attorneys' fees and \$36.30 of costs, for a total of \$15,336.30 will be incurred in connection		
22	with preparing the moving papers, replying to any opposition and appearing at the hearing of		
23	this motion. The recovery of attorneys' fees and expenses incurred in connection with		
24	moving for and obtaining an attorneys' fee award under §128.5 is authorized by Graham v.		
25	Daimler-Chrysler Corporation (2004) 34 Cal.4 553, 580 (see, also, Serrano v. Unruh (1982)		
26	32 Cal.3d 621, 632 ("Serrano IV").		
27	Accordingly, the Court is respectfully requested to award for attorneys' fees, costs		
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and expenses under §1021.5, the total of \$152,377.40 for fees, costs and expenses incurred in the proceeding and this motion. III. **CONCLUSION** For the reasons herein set forth, the Court is respectfully requested to award attorneys' fees under Code of Civil Procedure §1021.5 in the amount of \$152,377.40. Dated: June 20, 2005 Respectfully submitted, ROGER JON DIAMOND ESQ. Attorneys for Petitioner, Gil N. Mileikowsky, M.D. - 13 -